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There is an ongoing debate over the extent to which language development shares
common processing mechanisms with other domains of learning. It is well-established
that toddlers will systematically extend object labels to similarly shaped category
exemplars (e.g., Markman and Hutchinson, 1984; Landau et al., 1988). However,
previous research is inconclusive as to whether young children will similarly extend
factual information about an object to other category members. We explicitly contrast
facts varying in category relevance, and test for extension using two different tasks.
Three- to four-year-olds (N = 61) were provided with one of three types of information
about a single novel object: a category-relevant fact (‘it’s from a place called Modi’),
a category-irrelevant fact (‘my uncle gave it to me’), or an object label (‘it’s called a
Modi’). At test, children provided with the object name or category-relevant fact were
significantly more likely to display systematic category extension than children who learnt
the category-irrelevant fact. Our findings contribute to a growing body of evidence that
the mechanisms responsible for word learning may be domain-general in nature.
Keywords: cognitive development, language development, word learning, categorization, extension, domain
general
INTRODUCTION
Is our capacity for language the product of dedicated mental processes, or an assembly of broader
cognitive mechanisms operating in unison? This question is at the heart of understanding how
children learn to use and comprehend language. In the case of vocabulary development, the child
requires the ability to map words to their referents. The problem, in theory, is that there is an
infinite number of possible meanings for any given word (Quine, 1960). Yet, in practice, young
children learn words with remarkable ease. By the age of seventeen, the average English-speaker
knows more than 60,000 words (Bloom, 2000). Does this remarkable development require mental
processes specific to the task of word learning?
A longstanding perspective has been that domain-specific ‘constraints and biases’ are necessary
for solving the inductive difficulty of word learning (e.g., Golinkoff et al., 1994; Waxman and
Booth, 2000). Others argue that domain-general processes are sufficient for the task, whether basic
properties of learning, memory, and attention (e.g., Samuelson and Smith, 1998; Smith and Yu,
2008) or social pragmatic understanding (e.g., Baldwin and Tomasello, 1998). These contrasting
perspectives need not be in opposition; children may be flexible using multiple cues and processes
of differing specificities when word learning (Hirsh-Pasek et al., 2000; Yu and Ballard, 2007).
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However, the same word-learning behavior can often be
explained in different ways. To give one example, toddlers display
a ‘mutual exclusivity’ response where they typically select a novel,
name-unknown object as the referent of a novel label, rather
than a familiar, name-known object. This behavior could be the
outcome of a dedicated word-learning constraint (e.g., Mervis
and Bertrand, 1994), or it may involve a more domain-general
attentional bias toward novel stimuli (Horst et al., 2011; Mather
and Plunkett, 2012).
If word learning relies on domain-general cognitive mecha-
nisms, then one would expect to observe parallels between the
formation and retention of word mappings, and the mapping
of other information. It is not just words which can be
mapped to objects; other information such as associated actions,
gestures, and facts about an object also require mapping. If
the same behavior is evident when learning about different
types of mappings, the parsimonious conclusion is that common
processing mechanisms are in operation. Previous research has
provided evidence that there are parallels between word learning
and the mapping of actions to objects (Childers and Tomasello,
2002, 2003; Riggs et al., 2015; Dysart et al., 2016). In this paper,
we focus on investigating whether there are similarities in the
mapping of names and facts to objects.
Previous research has demonstrated that toddlers and pre-
schoolers may be able to rapidly map novel nouns to objects,
even with relatively brief exposure (e.g., Carey and Bartlett, 1978;
Heibeck and Markman, 1987; Woodward et al., 1994; Jaswal
and Markman, 2003; Holland et al., 2015), although it is less
clear how well these mappings are retained over time (see Horst
and Samuelson, 2008; Vlach and Sandhofer, 2012). A study
by Markson and Bloom (1997) investigated whether the ‘fast-
mapping’ of words to novel objects stretches to the mapping of
facts. In their procedure, pre-schoolers were introduced to a novel
word (e.g., “Let’s measure the koba”) for an unfamiliar object and
also a novel fact (e.g., “We can use the thing my Uncle gave
to me”) for another object. The children successfully mapped
and retained both the word and the fact for the object across
a retention interval of up to a month. The children performed
similarly when the fact also contained a novel label (e.g., “. . .came
from a place called Koba”). Markson and Bloom (1997, p. 813)
concluded that the specific process of fast-mapping is not limited
to words. More controversially, they further claimed to have
“evidence against a dedicated system for word learning in
children.”
Markson and Bloom’s case for a domain-general view of word
learning was disputed by Waxman and Booth (2000). In their
paper, they emphasize that word learning comprises a variety of
different processes, of which fast-mapping is just one. Hence,
Markson and Bloom do not have empirical evidence that all
aspects of word learning are the outcome of domain-general
processes. Waxman and Booth (2000) went on to investigate
the domain-specificity of another word learning process: the
extension of object names to other category members. It is well-
established that toddlers and preschoolers will systematically
extend a novel count noun to other members of the same object
category (e.g., Markman and Hutchinson, 1984; Landau et al.,
1988). Some (e.g., Markman, 1989; Booth and Waxman, 2002)
argue that young children make an assumption about category
membership – extending a word to other members of that
category. Others argue that young children have learned to use
shape-similarity as a reliable cue for count noun extension (e.g.,
Smith et al., 1996, 2002).
Waxman and Booth (2000) investigated whether pre-
schoolers would similarly extend newly learnt facts about objects.
Preschoolers were taught either a novel word, naming a novel
object (“It is called a koba”), or a novel fact (“My Uncle gave it
to me”) about a novel object. The children were then tested for
categorical extension of the word or fact, either immediately after
training, or after an interval of a week. Children were presented
with the original target, two additional target-category members,
and five other pairs of non-target exemplars. There were two free-
choice tasks to test for extension: a ‘yes/no’ task and a ‘choice’
task. In the yes/no task, each object was presented and the child
was asked whether the word or fact (depending on condition)
applied to the object. In the choice task, all test objects were
presented together and the child was asked either “Can you hand
me the one that is a koba?” (Word condition) or “Can you
hand me the one that my Uncle gave to me?” (Fact condition).
Once a choice was made, the selected object was removed,
and the question was repeated until no further selections were
made. Performance on the two category extension tasks varied
significantly between the word and fact conditions. Children in
the word condition displayed completely systematic extension to
only the target-category members in the yes/no and choice tasks,
both immediately and after a delay. In contrast, children in the
fact condition under-extended to target-category members and
over-extended to non-target objects. Hence, there appears to be
a clear pattern of categorical extension of words which does not
occur for the extension of facts. Waxman and Booth (2000) argue
on the basis of these results that there are different processes
involved in the extension of words and facts. Thus, word learning
may not involve purely domain-general processes as proposed by
Markson and Bloom (1997). This differential category extension
of words and facts has also been reported for children as young as
2.5 years of age (Behrend et al., 2001).
However, there is an important difference between the words
and facts used in this previous research. The novel words are
count nouns, as indicated by their grammatical form, e.g., ‘This
is a koba.’ Importantly, a count noun applies not just to the
originally labeled exemplar, but also to all other members of the
relevant category. However, it is far from clear that the novel
facts tested share this property of applying to all members of
the labeled category. The fact ‘My Uncle gave it to me,’ used
by Waxman and Booth (2000), would normally be interpreted
as applying only to that particular item, rather than as a fact
which applies to other category members (see also Childers and
Tomasello, 2003). Moreover, the pragmatic context (interpreting
an unfamiliar experimenter) may leave children uncertain over
whether or not to extend the new fact, creating inconsistent or
ad hoc patterns of extension. A similar argument can be made
about the facts used by Behrend et al. (2001), such as ‘the thing
that fell in the sink.’ Therefore, differences between the facts
and words employed in this research may simply reflect the
kind of facts used, rather than a fundamental difference between
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facts and words. A fairer comparison with count nouns requires
facts which are more readily interpreted as relevant to category
membership, i.e., facts which do not concern unique or accidental
properties of a specific item.
Other studies have distinguished between facts which apply
only to individual objects and facts which apply to a category of
objects. In an experiment reported by Diesendruck and Bloom
(2003), three-year-olds were provided with either category-
relevant facts (e.g., ‘it is used in the kitchen’) or category-
irrelevant facts (e.g., ‘I got this for my birthday’) about novel
objects. The children were then presented with a forced-choice
extension test. Children had a choice to extend the new fact to
another object which was either a shape match, a color match, or
a material match to the original referent. Children presented with
category-relevant facts were significantly more likely to make
shape-based extensions, than children provided with category-
irrelevant facts. However, the bias to make a shape match was
significantly above chance for children in both conditions. At first
sight, the children appear to be extending facts which should be
restricted to individual objects. Yet, the use of a ‘forced-choice’
procedure means that the children are required to extend the fact
to one of the three objects. As suggested by Diesendruck and
Bloom (2003), children in this condition may have defaulted to an
‘extend by shape’ strategy, given that shape is otherwise a reliable
cue for extension. Moreover, the same argument can be made for
the category-relevant facts – did the children really want to make
a category extension, or was it merely an artifact of the testing
procedure?
Finally, Deák and Toney (2013) observed that 4- to 5-year-olds
extend novel facts, in apparent contradiction to the findings of
Waxman and Booth (2000). Deák and Toney (2013) state that
their facts are ‘neutral’ with respect to being category-relevant.
However, some of the facts used are arguably specific to unique
exemplars (e.g., ‘my sister gave this to me,’ ‘I keep this on my
desk’), whereas others are more likely to apply to object categories
(e.g., ‘this is from Japan’). Deák and Toney (2013) do not report
data separately for each fact; hence it is unclear whether or not
the children were discriminating between them on the basis of
category relevance.
In sum, given the disparate findings across studies, we aim
to clarify whether or not facts are systematically extended to
other members of a category, and furthermore, what kinds of
facts might be extended. Evidence for the categorical extension
of both facts and nouns would provide further support for the
domain-generality of word learning. Presently, there is ambiguity
in the literature over how facts are classified with regards to
category relevance. In the experiment reported below, we clearly
distinguish between facts varying in category relevance, similar to
Diesendruck and Bloom (2003). This manipulation allows us to
test for patterns of extension in the predicted direction. Crucially,
children’s discrimination of different types of facts would provide
more convincing evidence that category-relevant facts are truly
classified and extended as such, rather than the outcome of an
ad hoc strategy. We additionally contrast two kinds of facts with
count nouns. Unlike Diesendruck and Bloom (2003), we use tests
of category extension similar to Waxman and Booth (2000) – a
free choice task, and a yes/no task. This testing procedure does
not force children to extend the fact or word to at least one
item. Therefore, all extension we do observe is a true reflection
of children’s preferences. We hypothesized that there would be
no significant difference in the extension of nouns and category-
relevant facts, but both would be significantly greater than the
extension of category-irrelevant facts.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
A total of 73 three- to four-year-olds originally participated and
were tested for comprehension. Of these, 61 children correctly
identified the original referent of the noun or fact, and went
on to be tested for extension. In the Object Label condition,
there were 19 children (9 male, 10 female) with a mean age
of 3.93 years (range = 3.34–4.94). In the Category-irrelevant
condition, there were 21 children (9 male, 12 female) with a mean
age of 3.92 years (range = 3.21–4.94). In the Category-relevant
condition, there were 21 children (6 male, 15 female) with a mean
age of 3.84 years (range = 3.20–4.52). There were no significant
differences in age, gender or vocabulary across conditions for
tests of comprehension or extension (all ps > 0.4).
Stimuli
Exposure Array and Comprehension Test Array
The Exposure Array, presented to the children during the
Exposure Session, comprised ten objects – six novel and four
familiar (See Figure 1). Children’s’ comprehension of the link
between the object and the novel object label or fact was tested
using the same array. The novel objects were sourced from a large
DIY store and will be referred to as a connector, double pipe
clip, elbow, pipe collar, hose clip, and pipe clip. The four familiar
objects were a pink teddy, a red sock, a blue pen, and a green duck.
During the Exposure Session the objects were placed upon a plain
white towel.
Extension Array
The Extension Array (see Figure 2) presented to children during
the Extension Test comprised 12 novel objects. There were six
pairs of two exemplars of each of the novel objects from the
exposure array. These exemplars shared the same shape with
the original exposure objects, but differed in color and/or size.
The extension array did not include the original target object
(cf. Waxman and Booth, 2000) to ensure an equal number of
exemplars for each object category. The presence of the original
target could otherwise bias selection of the target category.
Design
This study consisted of a between-participants experimental
design. A single independent variable of Information Type was
manipulated to vary the novel information provided about the
novel object. There were three Information Type conditions:
Object Label, Category-irrelevant, and Category-relevant. All
children were tested immediately after the exposure session.
There were two dependent variables: Comprehension Accuracy
and Extension Accuracy.
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FIGURE 1 | Exposure Array and Comprehension Test Array. From top, left to right: pink teddy, red sock, blue pen, green duck, white connector, blue double
pipe clip, copper elbow, chrome pipe collar, green hose clip and pink pipe clip.
FIGURE 2 | Extension Array. From top, left to right (six pairs): blue connector and pink connector; red double pipe clip and pink double pipe clip; green elbow and
red elbow; white pipe collar and blue pipe collar; red hose clip and blue hose clip; black pipe clip and blue pipe clip.
Procedure
Ethical approval was granted by the ethics committee of London
Metropolitan University. Informed consent was obtained from
parents and the head of the nursery school. The procedure
was based on Waxman and Booth (2000). All children initially
underwent a fast mapping task, where each child was introduced
to a novel count noun or novel fact in the exposure session.
Their comprehension and extension of this novel word or fact
was assessed in the testing session that immediately followed the
exposure session.
Exposure Session
Each child sat down at a table where a white towel was laid
out. They were presented with a transparent box containing six
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novel objects and four familiar objects (See Figure 1). They were
asked to get all ten objects out of the box and put them on the
table. This ensured that the children touched and looked at each
object, for roughly equivalent amounts of time. Following this
brief introduction to the objects, the experimenter started the
main task. The experimenter said, “Look. Here I have a towel”
and moved the ten objects to the side of the towel. Then the
experimenter said, “I want to put all of these things onto my
towel so that it makes a fun picture. Can you show me where to
put them so it looks really good? We’ll do it one at a time so,
we don’t miss any out.” The experimenter picked up one of the
ten objects and said, “Let’s start with this one.” After the child
had placed the object somewhere on the towel, the experimenter
praised the participant and picked up another object asking,
“Where would you put this one?” The experimenter continued
this process with each of the objects asking, “And how about this
one?” waiting for the child to place the object before going on
to the next one. Objects were chosen at random except that the
target object was never first or last. For all conditions, each of
the novel objects served as the target object in rotation across
participants.
The experimenter introduced some new information about
the target object. In the Object Label condition, the experimenter
said “This is really special – it’s called a modi – where do you
want to put this one?” In the Category-irrelevant condition, the
experimenter said “This is really special – my uncle gave it to me –
where do you want to put this one?” In the Category-relevant
condition, the experimenter said “This is really special – it’s from
a place calledModi – where do you want to put this one?” Once all
the objects had been placed on the towel the experimenter said,
“That’s brilliant, thank you. I think that looks really great. What
do you think? Are you happy with it?” and children were allowed
to change the position of any of the objects if desired.
Comprehension Test
All children took part in the Comprehension Test session directly
following the Exposure Session. Depending upon when the
target object was presented during the exposure session, the
child experienced a gap between exposure to the word or fact
mapping and subsequent comprehension testing that ranged
from approximately 30 s to 2 min.
Referring to the array of ten objects the experimenter said to
the child, “We’re going to put these away.” The experimenter then
asked one of three questions: “But just before we do, can you show
me which one is called a modi?” (Object Label condition) “. . ..can
you show me which one my uncle gave to me?” (Category-
irrelevant condition) or “. . ..can you show me which one comes
from a place called Modi?” (Category-relevant condition). Their
answer confirmed whether they had retained the word or fact
mapping.
The experimenter ended the Comprehension Test by saying,
“Can you help me by putting the things away now? They all
go back in the box.” For children who did not choose the
target object, this was the end of their participation in the
experiment. Children who answered the comprehension test
correctly were tested for extension of the newly learned word or
fact to additional objects from target and non-target categories.
Extension Test
Once the Exposure and Comprehension Test Array had been
tidied away, the experimenter opened the transparent box
containing the Extension Array (See Figure 2) and placed the
twelve objects randomly on the table in front of the participant.
All children underwent two extension tests similar to those used
by Waxman and Booth (2000). There was a Yes/No task and a
Choice task. To control for order effects the presentation of these
tasks was counterbalanced.
Yes/No task
The experimenter pointed to each object in turn, in a random
order, and asked, “Is this one a modi?” (Object Label condition),
“Is this one my uncle gave to me?” (Category-irrelevant
condition) or “Is this one from a place called Modi?” (Category-
relevant condition).
Choice task
The experimenter asked, “Can you see anything here that’s
called a modi?” (Object Label condition), “Can you see anything
here that my uncle gave me?” (Category-irrelevant condition)
or “Can you see anything here that comes from a place called
Modi?” (Category-relevant condition). After the participant’s
initial selection, the experimenter removed that object and
prompted the child for additional selections. For example, in the
Object Label condition, the experimenter said, “Are there any
other ones that are modis?” As in Waxman and Booth (2000),
the experimenter repeated this choice question until the child did
not select any other objects.
Vocabulary Test
Children’s vocabulary was tested approximately 1 week after the
comprehension and extension testing using The British Picture
Vocabulary Scale: Third Edition (BPVSIII) scale (Dunn et al.,
2009).
Scoring
For all conditions, selecting target objects earned a positive score,
selecting a non-target object earned a negative score, whilst
non-selection scored zero points across both extension tests.
Therefore, selecting only the target objects earned maximum
points. Scores for selecting target objects were weighted, as there
was a far larger proportion of non-target (10) to target objects
(2) – a ratio of 5:1. If random performance is what participants
would pick with their eyes shut, irrespective of how many picks
they make, they are five times more likely to pick a foil than a
target.
Yes/No
‘Yes’ responses received a score of+5 for the target exemplars and
−1 for the non-target category objects. ‘No’ responses received a
score of 0. This produced a score ranging from +10 to −10 for
each child.
Choice
Selecting objects from the target category received a score of +5,
selection of the non-target objects received a score of −1 and
objects that were not selected received a score of 0. This produced
a score ranging from+10 to−10 for each child.
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TABLE 1 | Comprehension Test: accuracy by condition.
Object selected Object label Category-irrelevant Category-relevant Total
Target 19 21 21 61
Non-target 5 3 4 12
Percentage of participants
selecting the target
79% 88% 84% 84%
FIGURE 3 | Mean extension test scores by Condition (error bars are ±
1 SE).
RESULTS
Comprehension Accuracy
Of the 73 participants, 61 answered the comprehension question
correctly by choosing the target object. As expected when tested
immediately, a high proportion (79–88%) of the children could
demonstrate their understanding of the mapping between the
target object and the novel word or fact (See Table 1). There
was not a significant difference in comprehension accuracy across
conditions, χ2 = 0.664, p= 0.798 (Fisher’s Exact Test). Binomial
tests showed that performance was greater than expected by
chance (1 in 6) in all three Information Type conditions
(p< 0.001).
Extension Accuracy
The 61 children who correctly chose the target in the compre-
hension test, also completed the extension test. Preliminary
analyses of differences across the Information Type conditions
revealed very similar patterns of data for the Yes/No and
Choice tasks. These similarities were confirmed by significant
correlations between the tasks by condition (all rs ≥ 0.45,
ps ≤ 0.031). For brevity, we therefore report the analysis of
scores aggregated across the two tasks. The weighted extension
scores for each test were added together to provide a total
weighted extension score for each participant, which could
range in integers from minus 20 (exclusively selecting non-target
exemplars) through zero to a maximum of plus 20 (exclusively
selecting target exemplars). This aggregate score provides a
complete picture of how the participant performed over both
tests and does not obscure any inconsistent response patterns
between the two tests.
The total weighted extension scores are presented in Figure 3.
The children in the Object Label condition (M = 16.42,
SD = 6.68) and the Category-relevant condition (M = 14.67,
SD = 6.73) tended to choose objects from the target category
at a greater rate than children in the Category-irrelevant
condition (M = 7.33, SD = 8.91). A One-Way ANOVA
revealed a significant effect of Information Type on children’s
extension of novel words and facts, FWelch (2,58) = 6.938,
p = 0.003 (Welch’s F statistic for unequal variances). Post hoc
multiple comparison tests (Games-Howell correction) revealed
a significant difference between the Object Label and the
Category-irrelevant conditions (p = 0.002) and, crucially,
a significant difference between the Category-relevant and
Category-irrelevant conditions (p = 0.013). There was no
significant difference between the Category-relevant and Object
Label conditions (p= 0.696).
Individual Extension Patterns
The above analyses have revealed lower scores for children
in the Category-irrelevant condition than for children in
either the Object Label or Category-relevant conditions. To
better understand why this difference occurred, every child’s
TABLE 2 | Extension Patterns by Information Type: the number and percentage of participants.
Information type YES/NO CHOICE
Target category only Extend to all Inconsistent Target category only Extend to all Inconsistent
Object label 14 0 5 16 1 2
74% 0% 26% 84% 5% 11%
Category-irrelevant 4 6 11 8 7 6
19% 29% 52% 38% 33% 29%
Category-relevant 12 4 5 16 3 2
57% 19% 24% 76% 14% 10%
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performance was classified into one of three primary response
patterns for both extension tasks. A ‘target category only’
extension pattern described participants who selected both
exemplars of the target category, but no other test objects.
An ‘extend to all’ extension pattern described participants who
selected at least 11 of the 12 test objects. An ‘inconsistent’
extension pattern described participants who selected objects
from the target and non-target categories of objects. Only two
participants selected no test objects at all within a task, and
neither did this for both tasks. Three participants’ did not
select the target category but their selection was limited to a
single non-target category. Only one of these three participants
replicated this pattern of responding across both the Yes/No and
Choice tasks. The remaining selection patterns were seemingly
random. Hence, all these extension patterns were summarized as
‘inconsistent.’
Children’s extension patterns for each extension task are
presented in Table 2. The Object Label and Category-relevant
conditions exhibited similar extension patterns – most children
(67–79%) extended only to the target category in both the Yes/No
and the Choice tasks. In contrast, less than 40% of children in
the Category-irrelevant condition extended only to the target
category in either task. The remaining children in the Category-
irrelevant condition were split fairly evenly between the ‘Extend
to All’ and the ‘Inconsistent’ extension patterns. A 3 × 3 χ2
test on the Yes/No data demonstrates a significant relationship
between condition and extension pattern, χ2 = 15.346, p= 0.003
(Fisher’s Exact Test). The Choice data provide similar results,
χ2 = 10.574, p= 0.026 (Fisher’s Exact Test).
Collapsing the extension patterns into two categories: ‘Target
Category Only’ and ‘Other’ allows post hoc multiple comparisons
using 2 × 2 χ2 tests to explore differences between pairs of
conditions. The adjusted critical p-value of 0.025 reflects the fact
that the data for each condition in the post hoc comparisons has
been analyzed twice. There was a significant difference between
the children’s extension pattern in the Category-irrelevant and
the Category-relevant conditions in the Yes/No test, χ2 = 6.462,
p = 0.011 and in the Choice test, χ2 = 6.222, p = 0.013. In
contrast, a comparison of Object Label and Category-relevant for
both the Yes/No task (χ2(1) = 1.200, p = 0.273) and the Choice
task (Fisher’s Exact Test, p = 0.698) reveals that children do not
extend general facts in a significantly different way from object
labels.
DISCUSSION
The current experiment compared children’s extension of an
object label and two different kinds of facts. The specific fact
was relevant to an individual object (“My uncle gave this to
me”), whereas the general fact was relevant to the category
from which the object came (“It comes from a place called
Modi”). Following Waxman and Booth (2000), we used extension
tasks which allowed children to freely decide whether or not
to extend the word or fact (cf. Diesendruck and Bloom, 2003).
It was found that children’s extension pattern varied as a
function of condition. Children in the Category-relevant and
Object Label conditions displayed similar response patterns of
exclusively selecting members of the target object category. In
contrast, children in the Category-irrelevant condition were more
likely to extend the specific fact to non-target category objects
than children in either the Category-relevant or Object Label
conditions. It would appear that if the fact is category-relevant
rather than object-specific, children will systematically extend the
fact to appropriate same-shaped objects. These results strongly
suggest that children can extend a fact to other same-category
items just like they do with words.
Our study is not the first to provide evidence of preschoolers’
extension of facts to same-category exemplars. However, we
provide a more stringent demonstration that young children
are capable of identifying a novel fact as category-relevant, and
to spontaneously extend the fact to other category members.
In contrast to Diesendruck and Bloom (2003), the use of a
free choice procedure means that the children were not forced
to select an object during the extension test. Furthermore,
we explicitly compare children’s responses to facts varying in
category relevance. Thus, we have evidence that the extension
of facts is actually sensitive to category relevance, rather than
occurring as an indiscriminate, ad hoc strategy. Our findings
extend the work of Diesendruck and Bloom (2003) and Deák and
Toney (2013) and demonstrate that young children’s readiness to
extend category-relevant facts stands up to a more robust test of
extension.
One issue, which remains, concerns the extension pattern of
children in the Category-irrelevant condition. It is less clear why
children in the Category-irrelevant condition chose to extend
the fact to some (or all) of the target and non-target exemplars,
when it arguably applies only to the originally designated object.
Given the use of a free choice task, one might have expected
the children not to have extended the fact at all. However, the
experiment may have nonetheless placed pragmatic ‘pressure’
on the children’s responses. For example, children may have
thought that the experimenter would not ask the question if
the answer was no. Moreover, with such a large array of test
objects available, children might think it odd for the fact not
to apply to at least some of the objects present. Alternatively,
the children may have struggled to clearly classify the fact as
either category-relevant or category-irrelevant, resulting in less
coherent extension patterns both within and across participants.
Children in the Category-irrelevant condition exhibited a larger
number of inconsistent selection patterns. Our experiment was
not designed to systematically investigate which foils were
selected. This would be an interesting avenue for future research.
An error analysis may provide some insight into children’s
extension choices for category-irrelevant facts.
Waxman and Booth (2000, 2001) have argued that the
extension of facts may not display the same characteristics as
the extension of nouns. They argue that while the appropriate
extension pattern for nouns can largely be determined by
grammatical form, the extension profile for facts is much less
clear and often depends on broader world knowledge. While
this might be true, Waxman and Booth point to differences
between the nature of words and facts themselves, rather than
differences in the mechanisms underlying extension. Arguably,
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a fact about the geographic origin of an object may not serve
to define category membership in the same manner as an object
label. Yet, we have shown that when a fact can be interpreted as
having relevance to a category, it will be systematically extended
to other category exemplars. Importantly, the children had no
prior experience of the novel fact and how it is extended. Thus,
the spontaneous and systematic extension of a novel fact suggests
a general mechanism for extension, rather than case-by-case
learning. Further research will need to establish whether, under
suitable experimental conditions, facts which denote specific
objects will be strictly restricted to the original referent.
A final caveat is that the fact introduced to children in the
Category-relevant condition was “It comes from a place called
Modi” which contains a novel non-word. Perhaps children are
extending this fact, not because it’s category-relevant, but because
they associate the novel word with the target object. They may
then extend this novel word, rather than the fact, to other
similar-shaped objects. However, this interpretation is unlikely
for two main reasons. First, other researchers have shown that
children will not extend category-irrelevant facts when they do
contain a novel word (Behrend et al., 2001) and, vice versa,
children will extend category-relevant facts when they don’t
contain a novel word (Diesendruck and Bloom, 2003). Second,
the category-relevant fact used in the present study introduces
a novel proper noun, and pre-schoolers have been shown not
to extend proper nouns (see Hall, 1999). So, if children in
this experiment had linked the novel word rather than the fact
with the object, they would have been more likely to extend
the fact at significantly less than chance levels – neither to
the target or non-target category objects. This was not the
case.
So it would appear that children treat the extension of novel
category-relevant facts and novel object labels that they have fast
mapped in a very similar way. This does not necessarily mean
that the same mechanism in the brain is used for extension
of linguistic facts and words. However, arguing that there are
two separate systems (for words and facts) determining whether
a piece of information applies to an individual or category
seems a less likely explanation, and certainly a more complex
one. Furthermore, our findings are consistent with other studies
demonstrating parallels between word learning and the mapping
and extension of other types of information to objects (Childers
and Tomasello, 2002, 2003; Riggs et al., 2015). Thus, contrary to
the view of Waxman and Booth (2000), the extension of words
appears to be part of a more domain-general mechanism. The
evidence here lends support to Bloom’s (2000) theory that word
learning is domain-general, drawing upon a variety of general
cognitive processes in a unique way to form and retain word
meanings.
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